# Data Security also FISMA

#### Scott Bradner

University Technology Security Officer Harvard University

Research Compliance Conference June 13, 2011

302-

## Issues in Research Data Security

- communication
- mindset
- communication
- understanding
- 'does this apply to ME?'
- acceptance
- data categorization
- technology
- communication

302-2

## A Process & Technology Example

- Harvard as a test case
- security policy at Harvard
- FISMA
- addressing research data security (or not)
- finally done
- now what?

302-3

#### Harvard

- general university structure is distributed "cloud education" (maybe 'quantum education') informal associations among Schools long history of local management
- recent (in the context of Harvard) push to change previous president 'do not accept' 'this is the way we have always done it'

e.g., forced unified calendar

current president continuing to push

e.g., new (September) unified CIO for central admin & FAS mostly through design phase of new IT organization covers central + FAS but will offer university-wide services

## Harvard Risk Management

- new (2010) university risk management structure
- university Risk Management Team chaired by University Executive Vice President but as of yet, no chief risk officer
- central Risk Management and Audit Services includes university auditor & insurance office
- Risk Management Team in each school generally chaired by school Administrative Dean includes all major administrative groups

   i.e., IT is only a member of team

302-5

## **Harvard IT Security**

- central policy, local implementation
- information security policy & compliance process has evolved to now be university-wide
   University Technology Security Officer (UTSO)
   Harvard Enterprise Information Security Policy (HEISP)
   HEISP compliance process
   Harvard Research Data Security Policy (HRDSP)
- new CISO named but role still being defined
- how policy & compliance fits in new IT organization still under development

#### **Harvard Research**

research oversight is slightly less distributed

```
e.g., 3 Institutional Review Boards
fewer than at times in the past
e.g., 3 Offices of Sponsored Projects
```

Vice Provost for Research

```
http://vpr.harvard.edu/
research policy, conflict of interest policy, IPR policy, etc.
includes a Chief Research Compliance Officer
```

202.7

#### HEISP

 Harvard Enterprise Information Security Policy (HEISP)

```
a set of University-wide policies to protect
confidential information
annual training, etc
annual compliance assessment process
checked by Risk Management (Internal Audit) during
audits
```

collaboratively developed & updated
 UTSO & CIOs

## **HEISP Information Categories (3)**

- ◆ High Risk Confidential Information (HRCI) financial identifiers (SSN, credit card, bank account) government identifiers (drivers license, passport) health information & biometric identifiers most also covered by Mass disclosure reporting law
- other confidential information student & employment information university-designated confidential information
- non-confidential information

302-9

## HEISP, contd.

 detailed requirements for each type of confidential information

http://www.security.harvard.edu/enterprise-security-policy

- detailed self assessment worksheet
   http://www.security.harvard.edu/files/resources/forms/
   EnterpriseSecurityComplianceWorksheetFinal.xls
- annual compliance process uses worksheet & in person visits
  - each school & central administration group

#### Research Data Policies - #1

- prodded by Patriot Act requirements draft policies were developed to protect research data reviewed by IRBs presented at PRIM&R provided to VP for research
- but...
   draft policies went nowhere
   VP for research left
   no one owned the problem or the solution

302-11

## Data Use Agreements (DUAs)

- researcher received a DUA that threatened jail time if the data was not protected
- resulted in formal signing process for DUAs use agreement signed by OSP if school CIO says researcher can meet protection requirements even if no money involved
- note OGC says that the university must not support a researcher that signs on their own if agreement required signing "for the university"
- same issue for grants & contracts
   can include stealth security requirements

## **Grant & Contract Requirements**

- data protection requirements are appearing in grants and contracts.
  - potential increase in FISMA requirements; e.g., research grants with VA data require FISMA
- researchers and Sponsored Projects groups must be warned to look for these requirements; it is unlikely that researchers will notice however...

requirements are binding even if they were not noticed

302-13

## **DUA Requirements**

- becoming quite common to get 3rd party data and in grants and contracts
   not just in government g&c
- can include very specific requirements
- can just say 'protect the data'
- potentially significant penalties for non-compliance
   e.g., can be required to return already spent grant money
   and in a few cases, criminal charges

#### **FISMA**

- Federal Information Security Management Act mixed view of effectiveness
- some push in federal agencies to include FISMA security requirements in grants & contracts grant agent may add requirement w/o understanding
- 3-level system classification low-impact, moderate-impact, high-impact
- system classification based on highest level required by a criteria: confidentiality, integrity, availability

302-15

## FISMA, contd.

- ◆ NIST 800-53rev3, July 2009, errata to June 2010
- 237 page document
- ◆ 174 active requirements in 18 control families not all requirements apply at all classifications high classification frequently requires automated mechanisms to meet requirements moderate classification sometimes requires automated mechanisms to meet requirements

## FISMA, Control Families

Access Control (Technical)

Awareness and Training (Operational)

Audit and Accountability (Technical)

Security Assessment and Authorization (Management)

Configuration (Management) (Operational)

Contingency Planning (Operational)

Identification and Authentication (Technical)

Incident Response (Operational)

Maintenance (Operational)

Media Protection (Operational)

Physical and Environmental Protection (Operational)

Planning (Management)

Personnel Security (Operational)

Risk Assessment (Management)

System and Services Acquisition (Management)

System and Communications Protection (Technical)

System and Information Integrity (Operational)

Program Management (Management)

302-17

## FISMA, Implementation

- after meeting requirements may need to have facility certified and accredited for-fee process
- on-going monitoring of compliance required
- meeting FISMA is complex and expensive

## FISMA, Usefulness

some comments

Karen Evans (ex CTO, OMB)

often a "paperwork exercise" that does not improve security

Alan Paller (SANS Institute)

FISMA gets in the way of effective security

- too often "FISMA" is required w/o classification because agency was told to require FISMA
- new guidance document NIST 800-39
- congress (often) working on changes

302-19

#### FISMA in Research

- push back against FISMA requirements often successful
- but accepting research that requires FISMA and not being compliant could be very costly
- FISMA at a university

low - could be met by well run university data centers with some effort

moderate - possible to be met by well run university data centers with a lot of effort & expense

high - unlikely to ever be met by a regular university data center

## Other Data Protection Requirements

- most states also have data protection requirements e.g., Mass 201 CMR 17
- federal requirements for medical & student records (HIPPA, FERPA)
  - e.g., Mass Gen agreed to pay a \$1M penalty for misplacing medical records concerning 192 people
- VA requires FISMA protections university researcher locked out of research lab for failure to meet FISMA requirements
- local penalties can be harsh
   UNC researcher demoted & pay cut after breach
   http://chronicle.com/article/Chapel-Hill-Researcher-Fights/124821

302-21

#### Research Data Policies - #2

- this time process driven by chair of Social Science Committee, Provost and new the Vice Provost for Research
  - policy "owned" by VP for Research
- draft reviewed by IRBs, School CIOs, OGC, Social Science Committee, Provost, University Joint Committee on Inspection, ...
- multi-year process
- (finally) approved October 2010
   http://www.security.harvard.edu/research-data-security-policy

## HRDSP, Sections

- Introduction
- Research Information from Non-Harvard Sources
- Research Information from Harvard Sources
- Information Security Categories
- Legal Requests for Research Information

302-23

### Introduction

- responsibilities: investigators:
   disclose nature of data
   prepare data security plans & procedures
   implement plans & procedures
- responsibilities: IRB
   ensure adequacy of investigators plans & procedures
- responsibilities: IT
   assist investigators in determining proper levels
   assist investigators in implementing security

#### **Data From Non-Harvard Sources**

if data has a use agreement (DUA)

protection must meet requirements in DUA agreement note: researchers can not sign DUAs for the University - OSP is the designated signer (even if no money involved)

IRB can determine that DUA requirements are too weak if so, treat as if data is from a Harvard source

- if research done in non-Harvard facility
   facility owner may define protection requirements
- otherwise
   treat as if data is from a Harvard source

302-25

#### **Data From Harvard Source**

- human subjects research
   research must be reviewed by a IRB
   information used in research must be protected against
   inadvertent or inappropriate disclosure
   IRB will confirm security level categorization
- other sensitive research

   e.g. research with national security implications
   researchers should work with school IT groups to determine data categories

## **Data Categories**

- five research data Levels were created by augmenting the HEISP.
  - Level 5 extremely sensitive information about individually identifiable people
  - Level 4 very sensitive information about individually identifiable people (same as HEISP HRCI)
  - Level 3 sensitive information about individually identifiable people (same as HEISP other confidential information)
  - Level 2 benign information about individually identifiable people
  - Level 1 de-identified research information about people and other non-confidential research information

302-27

## Why 5 Levels?

started with HEISP - 3 levels

high risk confidential information (level 4) other confidential information (level 3) non-confidential information (level 1)

added level 5

because non-network connected requirement is in some use agreements and is the right thing for some data

added level 2

pragmatic - researchers are not willing to be significantly inconvenienced just to protect information they do not see as risky

## **De-Identification Key**

- key for coded de-identified research information must be protected at the level that would have been applicable to the non-de-identified data
- what constitutes de-identification is not addressed in policy

302-29

## Level 5

description:

Disclosure of Level 5 information could cause significant harm to an individual if exposed, including, but not limited to, serious risk of criminal liability, serious psychological harm or other significant injury, loss of insurability or employability, or significant social harm to an individual or group

examples
 currently mostly requirement from data use agreements
 raw census data, some mental health records

## Level 5: Protections

 stored in physically secure rooms in university space

not on janitor's key or building master key need accessible fireman's key

 computers must not be connected to a network that extends outside the room

302-31

#### Level 4

description

Disclosure of Level 4 information could reasonably be expected to present a non-minimal risk of civil liability, moderate psychological harm, or material social harm to individuals or groups.

examples

HEISP high risk confidential information (HRCI)
e.g., subject's SSNs
medical research records
information with national security implications

302-32

#### Level 4: Protections

- do not store on user computers or devices even if encrypted (too much risk of error)
- servers in physically secure Harvard environments card based access best - create access log
- local network-based firewalls.
- access limited to IRB approved individuals
- media must be encrypted or stored in a locked safe
- separate networks using private addressing
- regular vulnerability testing
- backup tapes must be encrypted

302-33

#### Level 3

description

Disclosure of Level 3 information would could reasonably be expected to be damaging to a person's reputation or to cause embarrassment.

examples

most non-de-identified human research information student record information (FERPA) some commercial data employment records

#### Level 3: Protections

- encrypt laptops and portable devices
- use automatic patching
- virus protection
- encrypt all transfer over networks and on portable media
- ♦ limit access to those doing the research
- host-based firewalls
- lock up all non-electronic records

302-35

#### Level 2

description

Disclosure of Level 2 information would not ordinarily be expected to result in material harm, but as to which a subject has been promised confidentiality.

called "minimal risk" information under the common rule

examples

data from reaction time experiments customer satisfaction survey data

## **Level 2: Protections**

 good computer hygiene secret complex passwords not shared accounts regular patching avoid dangerous web sites don't respond to phishing

302-37

## Level 1

description

de-identified research information about people and other non-confidential research information

examples

de-identified research information
but might be private until publication
student directory information
except for students with 'FERPA blocks'
research information where no anonymity promised

## Legal Requests for Research Info.

- forward any legal request of information (e.g., a subpoena, national security request or court order demanding disclosure of information in researcher possession) to OGC
- researchers not authorized to provide the information
- consider obtaining a Certificate of Confidentiality allow refusal to disclose

302-39

#### Other Information

- policies include specific guidance on how to do data collection in the field for each level data
- web site also includes:

requirements when working with vendors

process for responding to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests (send to OGC)

classified work (can not do)

advice for travelers

http://www.security.harvard.edu/advisory-travelers rules concerning paying subjects (i.e., tax requirements)

## How Much Detail?

- 1st version gave general directions e.g., treat as HEISP Level 4
- pushback from Joint Committee on Inspection
   wanted self contained requirements that could be audited
- now getting pushback that the requirements are blocking research making things too hard want "risk-based approach"
- going to be a common conflict
   need to be detailed to meet detailed regulations, but too much detail is 'too hard to meet'

302-41

## **Implementation**

 specific protection requirements for each level existing HEISP level protection requirements well understood

Levels 5 and 2 will take some work special facilities for Level 5 researcher cooperation for Level 2

communications to researchers

letter from VP Research annually by Deans day-to-day by IRBs

a better path than for administrative information security IRBs have created new forms

## Implementation, contd.

certify facilities

pre-certify a facility for a particular level reduces IRB & CIO work

e.g., OK if researcher using a Level 4 certified facility for Level 4 or lower work

multiple certifications under way

enforcement is an open question

302-43

## **Enforcement**

- researcher is the responsible party
   e.g., signs attestation of compliance
  - annual report to IRB on research will include statement of compliance to HEISP
- audits

internal audit developing an audit plan
IRB process, researcher compliance & IT governance
will perform trial audit soon of level 5 facility

plan to perform 2 audits per year

#### **Another Issue**

- federal regulations require that the university "immediately" produce data from federally funded research
  - e.g., in case accusation of research fraud
- can be a problem if researcher runs their own systems or uses non-university resources can you say "cloud computing"?
- not addressed in HRDSP

302-45

## **Remaining Issues**

- communication
- mindset
- communication
- understanding
- 'does this apply to me?'
- acceptance
- categorization of actual data
- technology
- communication

302-46

